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Introduction
Paul Ricoeur is one of the most original and provocative philosophers 
writing today. He is best known for his work in philosophy of language, 
psychology, historiography, social science method, literary theory, and re­
ligious studies. At a time when the usefulness of disciplinary boundaries 
is being questioned, Ricoeur’s prodigious oeuvre is animated by a spirit 
of interdisciplinary interrogation that generates original insights into many 
of the most challenging intellectual and cultural issues we currently face. 
His wide-ranging studies bridge modes of inquiry that have long existed in 
isolation from one another, making his work field-encompassing without 
lacking depth, rigorously argued without being hegemonistic.
Ricoeur is a philosopher of conversation and mediation. He embodies 
the Socratic dictum that truth is a dialogic event as he seeks maieutically to 
bring forth a variety of possible perspectives on the questions under discus­
sion. His charitable interpretations of diverse positions reflect a wide and 
generous philosophical style that allows him to uncover the often hidden 
middle ground between the factions that characterize contemporary intel­
lectual life. But his attempts at rapprochement never purchase mediation 
at the price of ignoring important differences. Rather, Ricoeur’s aim is pa­
tiently to track the topography of a particular debate in order to articulate 
a via media (often unseen by the disputants) by which one can negoti­
ate the questions at hand. Truth—or better, deeper insight into hitherto 
unforeseen possibilities—emerges as a result of this careful tracking pro­
cess. Truth happens in the space opened up in the conversation between 
newly found dialogue partners—whether those dialogue partners be human 
interrogators, literary texts, works of art, or cultural artifacts.
“Beyond the desert of criticism we wish to be called again.In spite 
of (or to spite?) the death of God and the demystification of the cosmos, 
Ricoeur’s dialogic thought echoes with a longing for spiritual values and 
forces once felt by primordial peoples but now forgotten in a technologi­
cal age. An authentic response to the question Who am I? is founded, in 
part, on a recovery of the sacred by taking up residence in the worlds of




mythopoetic literature, such as the Bible. Ricoeur well knows that a simple 
return path back to the powers of traditional religions is no longer tenable. 
But his writing is characterized, nevertheless, by a fragile hope that in the 
borderlands beyond calculative reason there might be a world of transcen­
dent possibilities (mediated through the text) that can refigure and remake 
the world of the reader. The recovery of the power of myth and symbol 
is possible only through a self-critical, always revisable, and never certain 
hermeneutical wager. By risking this wager, the interpreter advances, even 
perhaps realizes, the task of becoming an integrated self. The first naivete 
of primordial openness to religious symbolism has long been lost to modern 
people, but a second naivete of belief founded on the traces of the sacred 
in the world of the text is possible.
In the first half of this introduction I offer a chronological reading of Ri- 
coeur’s intellectual biography with special reference to his work in religious 
studies. In the second half I conclude with comments concerning the scope 
and rationale of this anthology. I unify my exposition around a distinctively 
Ricoeurian thesis: the journey to selfhood is made possible by the subject’s 
willingness to receive new ways of being through its interactions with the 
text-worlds of literature, myth, and religion.
Intellectual Biography
Early Development
Paul Ricoeur was born in Valence, France, on February 27, 1913, and 
raised by his grandparents in Brittany in the minority tradition of the Prot­
estant Huguenots. He graduated with the Agregation de Philosophic from 
the Sorbonne in 1935 and attended seminars conducted by Gabriel Mar­
cel. From 1940 to 1945 he was interned in a German POW camp, where 
he was allowed to study German philosophy and theology, including the 
works of Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heideg­
ger, Karl Jaspers, Rudolf Bultmann, and Karl Barth. After the war he taught 
the history of philosophy at the University of Strasbourg (1948-57) and re­
turned to the Sorbonne to occupy the chair of metaphysics (1956-1967). 
He was active in the Parisian socialist movement and the promotion of so­
cial democracy against the threat of market-driven capitalism. He wrote 
numerous articles for France’s left-wing Christian journals—in particular. 
Esprit and Le Christianisme social—on the power of religious socialism to 
engender community and solidarity and overcome the alienation of modern 
urban life.^ In the 1940s and 1950s he became especially well known for
2. Some of this material is in English translation. See Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, 
trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965), and Political and 
Social Essays, ed. David Stewart and Joseph Bien (Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 1974).
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his writings in existential phenomenology and as both a translator of and 
commentator upon Husserl’s thought.^
In these early studies Ricoeur argues for Husserl’s methodologically 
controlled reflection in the Logical Investigations as a more rigorous ex­
tension of Marcel’s existentialism. He agrees with Husserl that the value 
of phenomenological method lies in its description of consciousness to be 
a consciousness of something, a moving outside of oneself to the object 
or phenomenon intended. He avers, however, that Husserl’s later work 
replaces the description of phenomena given to consciousness with the el­
evation of the transcendental ego’s powers of unmediated perception of 
the world. Because all understanding is determined by one’s historically 
situated presuppositions concerning the external world, Ricoeur main­
tains that Husserl’s idealizing tendencies must be resisted by a philosophy 
that grafts the hermeneutics of signs and symbols onto the trunk of the 
phenomenological description of intentional objects.
This movement toward a “hermeneutical phenomenology” is anticipated 
in the second installment of a tripartite series by Ricoeur on the philoso­
phy of the will. The first part consists of the volume Freedom and Nature: 
The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1950; Eng. trans. 1966), in which 
Ricoeur utilizes phenomenological method to describe the volitional and 
nonvolitional structures of the will. The second part consists of two sep­
arate books. Fallible Man (1960; Eng. trans. 1965) and The Symbolism 
of Evil (1960; Eng. trans. 1967), and the third part, now permanently 
suspended, was intended to be a poetics of the will. Although this third 
volume is technically in abeyance, the goal of this book—to develop a 
hermeneutical philosophical anthropology beyond the confines of phenom­
enology—has been realized by Ricoeur’s subsequent writings, especially 
his most recent Oneself as Another (1990; Eng. trans. 1992). His many 
“detours,” as he calls them, since the 1950s into psychoanalysis, struc­
turalism, analytic philosophy, social theory, discourse analysis, narratology, 
and deconstruction have left him uninterested in formally completing the 
projected poetics of the will. The value of these detours, however, is that 
they have enabled Ricoeur to articulate a more complicated discordant- 
concordant understanding of human being than was available to him at 
the time he had projected finishing his trilogy.
All his early writings on the structure of the will make the same claim: 
human beings are tethered between freedom and nature, between the self-
3. See inter alia Paul Ricoeur and Michel Dufrenne, Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de 
I’existence (Paris: Seuil, 1947), and Paul Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers (Paris: 
Temps Present, 1948). Ricoeur translated into French with commentary volume 1 of 
Husserl’s Ideas in 1950; also see Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, 
ed. and trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern Univ. 
Press, 1967).
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transcending powers of the imagination and the always limiting character 
of perspectival, fragmented experience. The possibility of an undivided self, 
the task of becoming a “whole soul,” begins with reflective analysis on 
these two poles. Through this analysis, a self in possession of itself is “won” 
by a fragile mediation of the consciousness of freedom and the brokenness 
of unfulfilled desire. Selfhood is a task to be performed, not a given that 
awaits passive reception by the subject.
Fallible Man maintains that the always already disproportion between 
freedom and finitude is the constitutional weakness that makes evil pos­
sible. Content with an exposition of the limit-concept of fallibility, this 
study does not push forward to an analysis of the concrete manifesta­
tions of fault in the human condition. This further analysis is deployed in 
The Symbolism of Evil, the companion volume to Fallible Man, where the 
turn is accomplished from a phenomenological (eidetic) description of the 
faulted disproportion in human being to an interpretation (hermeneutic) 
of symbols and myths concerning actual evil. “First of all, my investiga­
tion into the Symbolism of Evil, which followed upon the Voluntary and 
the Involuntary and Fallible Man, carried me to the heart of the herme­
neutical tradition. For in the case of evil there is no direct concept but, to 
begin with, symbols, narratives, myths, instead.In The Symbolism of Evil 
Ricoeur takes up his central question, “What is the meaning of human be­
ing?” by submerging his analysis in the opaque worlds of story and symbol. 
The problem of noncoincidence with oneself is again manifest, but now in 
a mythological register: to be human is to be estranged from oneself be­
cause all humans, though destined for fulfillment, are inevitably captive to 
an “adversary” greater than themselves. The bitter irony of this predica­
ment is most effectively symbolized by the myth of Adam’s fall. Though 
the story is putatively about historical origins, it functions as an etiologi­
cal myth about a cosmic battle between good and evil already anterior to 
Adam’s decision. Adam is figured as alternately responsible for his own free 
decision and yet in bondage to an evil power outside of himself. Thus as 
both free and determined, human beings, like Adam, are “responsible and 
captive, or rather... responsible for being captive.”^
The Symbolism of Evil brings religious studies to the threshold of a 
new methodology as a hermeneutical, rather than a strictly philosophical 
or dogmatic, discipline. Religious studies is a public inquiry into the mean­
ing of symbolic discourses, not a rationalist justification of religious beliefs 
or a confessionalist defense of traditional doctrines. Ricoeur argues for the 
premier value of mythopoetic forms of expression, rather than purely philo-
4. Paul Ricoeur, “My Relation to the History of Philosophy,” The lliff Review 35 
(1978): 9.
5. Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, 101.
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sophical or theological modes of discourse, for understanding the meaning 
of human being in a world charged with the presence and absence of the 
sacred. The relative superiority of myth over philosophy—or “fiction” over 
“reason”—is manifest in the power of religious creation stories to uncover 
the structural disparity in human beings between their fractured nature and 
their destinies as integrated selves. This disparity can be imagined only 
indirectly on the basis of mythical imagery; it cannot be studied directly 
through a rationalist analysis of human history and-culture. The myths of 
the Hebrews and Greeks concerning primordial chaos, primeval fall, origi­
nal defilement, exile from paradise, tragic fate, and the servile will contain 
a surplus of meaning hostile to modes of intellectual inquiry that a priori 
deny to myths and symbols any truth-value concerning the nature of the 
human condition. The point is not that religious symbolism is irrational or 
unamenable to philosophical inquiry, but that the rationality of the sym­
bol is available only to the theorist who values the efficacy of mythical 
literatures.
“The symbol gives rise to thought, and thought returns to the symbol.”^ 
Ricoeur defines the symbol as a multiple-meaning expression characterized 
by a hidden logic of double reference. Symbols are like signs in that they 
intend something beyond themselves. But whereas the sign possesses a rel­
atively obvious and conventional set of denotations, the symbol’s meanings 
are polysemic, difficult to discern, and virtually inexhaustible in depth. Ri­
coeur uses the example of the symbol “defilement” to make this point. 
“Defilement” is a double-meaning expression in which the clear, literal 
meaning stands for the state of physical uncleanliness, while the opaque, 
figurative meaning “points beyond itself to something that is like a stain 
or spot,”^ as when one refers to ritual impurity or moral evil as a “stain” 
or “blemish” on one’s character. Because the symbol possesses a figura­
tive reference, it demands interpretation in a way that the transparent sign 
does not.
Ricoeur maintains that human beings enter consciousness as prior deni­
zens of a world of symbols and myths. Figurative language first interprets 
us before we interpret it. Since there are no “shortcuts” to selfhood, only 
when the subject traverses a hermeneutical “long route” through the .reveal­
ing power of the symbol can she or he enlarge and empower a fuller and 
more satisfying understanding of the self. This route follows a path from 
the loss of original belief in the sacred to a critical recovery of the power 
of myth in a world empty of meaning and hope. “Does that mean that 
we could go back to a primitive naivete? Not at all. In every way, some­




no longer live the great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the 
original belief in them, we can, we modern men, aim at a second naivete 
in and through criticism. In short, it is by interpreting that we can hear 
again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning and the 
endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.”* A critical 
consciousness needs the complement of a mature openness to the symbolic 
world; a hermeneutic of suspicion operates in productive tension with a 
hermeneutic of restoration. In this dialectic the voice of the sacred can be 
heard again, not in the mode of a precritical naivete but by an interpretive 
gesture, a second naivete, that wagers on the power of myth and symbol to 
elucidate the nature of human being.
The Hermeneutical Turn
In 1967 Ricoeur left the Sorbonne and joined the faculty of the University 
of Paris at Nanterre, where he was later appointed dean in 1969. At Nan- 
terre he was instrumental in mediating the conflicts between faculty and 
students over the cries for reform in the French university system during the 
Paris uprisings of 1968. He did collaborative work with Emmanuel Levinas 
and was one of Jacques Derrida’s teachers. At this time he also became a 
permanent faculty member of the University of Chicago with appointments 
in the Divinity School, the Department of Philosophy, and the Committee 
on Social Thought. He resigned from Nanterre in 1980 and continues as 
professor emeritus at Chicago.
After the appearance of The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur has published 
only one book-length project primarily devoted to the study of religion.^ 
Rather, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed his attempts systematically to work 
out a general theory of interpretation (with regional application to re­
ligious studies) in the light of the “hermeneutical turn” in his thought. 
Three books (Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation [1965; 
Eng. trans. 1970], The Rule of Metaphor [1975; Eng. trans. 1978], and 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning [1976]) and 
as many collections of essays (History and Truth [1955, 1964; Eng. trans. 
1965], The Conflict of Interpretations [1969; Eng. trans. 1974], and The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work [1978]) develop
8. Ibid., 351.
9. See Paul Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 4 (1975): 29-148, where Ricoeur 
analyzes the parables of Jesus as refigurations of time at its limits; the parables display 
before the imagination the eternal and extravagant in the midst of the everyday. For another 
large-scale writing in religion, there is also his unpublished Sarum Lectures from Oxford 
University, 1980, on the topic of biblical interpretation and narrative theology. A small 
section of this manuscript, roughly pages 8-36, is included below in a revised form in 
“Biblical Time.”
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further theories of the imagination and the text beyond his earlier concern 
with myth and symbol.
These studies begin with a detour through psychoanalysis over the 
question of whether a restorative hermeneutics is possible after Freud’s 
reconstruction of the human as a source of conflicted desires and unre­
solved forces. Earlier Ricoeur had written that the subject can construct 
a new identity through its commerce with self-generated figures of the 
imagination. The subject can experience “redemption through imagina­
tion” because in “imagining his possibilities, man can act as a prophet of 
his own existence.”'® But now Ricoeur follows Freud’s description of the 
imagination, or consciousness, as a projection of unconscious distortions 
and impulses, or false consciousness. The subject who thinks and feels and 
dreams is a “wounded cogito” riddled with illusions of freedom and self- 
sufficiency. Nevertheless, Freud’s location of the origins of the subject in 
false consciousness must be positioned against a similar projection of sym­
bols and figures of a new humanity. In the dialectical spirit of his aborted 
poetics of the will, Ricoeur contends that an archaeology of the decentered 
subject should stand in tension with a teleology of the fulfilled subject that 
takes seriously, though not literally, childhood dreams, works of art, and re­
ligious symbols as lived possibilities for a transformative future. In spite of 
its overdetermined origins, the imagination can activate these possibilities 
and offer the broken subject new modes of being in the world.
Ricoeur’s work from this period makes three points concerning the rela­
tionship between philosophical inquiry and religious faith. First, authentic 
faith emerges by way of its circuitous travels through a sustained her­
meneutics of suspicion. What a Marx or a Nietzsche or a Freud offers 
the believing community is a panoply of iconoclastic devices for smashing 
the idols of belief naively unaware of its origins in certain systemic dis­
tortions—be those distortions economic, philosophical, or psychodynamic. 
But “to smash the idols is also to let the symbols speak.”" In the ten­
sion between iconoclasm and belief—or distanciation and appropriation, as 
Ricoeur sometimes puts it—the believer’s presuppositions are productively 
challenged even as the critic’s assumptions are put to the test. Since the acid 
bath of criticism is mutually purifying for both modes of inquiry, neither 
the critic nor the believer emerges unscathed from this dialectical encounter. 
“The faith of the believer cannot emerge intact from this confrontation, but 
neither can the Freudian conception of reality.”'^ The burden of faith is to
10. Paul Ricoeur, “The Image of God and the Epic of Man,” in History and Truth, 127.
11. Paul Ricoeur, “The Critique of Religion,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An 
Anthology of His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1978), 219.
12. Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale Univ. 
Press, 1970), 551.
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evoke a refined passion for the possible by way of an excavation of the 
distortions at the base of its origins.
Second, the metaphorical imagination is an ally for the understanding 
and articulation of faith. In its essence, faith is a living out of the figures of 
hope unleashed by the imagination. Glossing Kant, Ricoeur argues for the 
power of the productive imagination to “schematize” novel relationships 
between the data of experience and the figures of the imagination even 
though both realms of understanding seem initially unrelated to one an­
other. The imagination generates new metaphors for synthesizing disparate 
aspects of reality that burst conventional assumptions about the nature of 
things. Figurative discourses suspend first-order references to literal objects 
and events in order to liberate second-order references to a more basic 
and nonliteral world of unimagined possibilities. The role of the living 
metaphor is to juxtapose two dissimilar forms of articulation in order to 
bring to language dimensions and values of reality that have been previ­
ously hidden by straightforward, descriptive discourse. “[Mjetaphor is the 
rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fic­
tions have to redescribe reality.”^^ “Lamb” and “God,” for example, are 
two distinct terms that resist combination. But the union of both terms in 
the metaphor “lamb of God” sets free a new understanding of the divine 
life—as bloody and innocent salvation-bringer—hitherto unavailable to the 
interpreter apart from this metaphorical innovation.
Third, the power of the text to disclose new possibilities offers the reader 
an expanded view of the world and a deeper capacity for selfhood. “It is 
the text, with its universal power of world disclosure, which gives a self to 
the ego.”'"* On this point Ricoeur’s lively dialogue with his critics comes to 
the fore. As he counters some analytic philosophers’ arguments against the 
truth-value of poetic texts, he also disagrees with certain literary theorists’ 
contention that such texts operate within a self-enclosed, private universe 
that makes no purchase on everyday experience. His point is that the vast 
majority of poetic texts do refer to the world, though not the world ac­
cessible to thoroughgoing positivism and aestheticism, but the world now 
refigured under the tutelage of the imaginary and the possible. Poetic lan­
guage does intend reality—it is not a language unto itself divorced from any 
referential function—but its power of reference is the power to set forth 
novel ontologies that disorient readers in order to reorient them by way of 
an ever-expanding vision of the whole.
In theological parlance, Ricoeur maintains that a variety of nonreligious 
and religious fictions (including the Bible) are potentially revelatory—not
13. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin 
and John Costello (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977), 7.
14. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Interpretation of Meaning 
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), 95.
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in the sense that they are deposits of divinely inspired truths but because 
they faithfully enact a productive clash, and sometimes a fusion, between 
their world and the world of the reader. Ricoeur understands revelation in 
performative, not propositional, terms: it is an event of new meaning be­
tween text and interpreter, rather than a body of received doctrines under 
the control of a particular magisterium. He refers to the disclosive power 
of figurative (including sacred) texts as an “areligious sense of revelation” 
just insofar as any poetic text—by virtue of its powers of metaphorical ref­
erence—can become a world that I inhabit and within which I project my 
innermost possibilities. The world of the text can figure the identity of the 
sacred and reveal dimensions of the human condition as such for any reader 
who risks her own self-understanding in the process.^^
Ricoeur’s analysis of the referential function of literary works is an ex­
tension and correction of the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. Heidegger maintains that works of art reveal the character of re­
ality by disclosing to the observer the “world” depicted in the art work. 
Vincent van Gogh’s paintings of peasant shoes, for example—with their 
separated soles, frayed threads, and protruding nails—distill the very es­
sence of working-class life in late nineteenth-century France. “The art work 
opens up in its own way the Being of beings.”'^ Aesthetic objects offer di­
rect access to the nature of Being. With some qualifications Gadamer agrees 
with Heidegger’s thesis concerning the truth of art; he further specifies its 
application in terms of a “fusion of horizons” between the world of the 
reader and the world of the text.'^ Understanding occurs in the to-and-fro 
dialogue between text and interpreter whenever the interpreter is willing 
to be put into question by the text and risk openness to the world of 
possibilities the text projects.
While Ricoeur consistently appropriates these insights into the truth- 
value of art and the dynamics of horizon-fusion, he enters a caveat against 
a certain romanticist bias against explanation in the German hermeneutical 
tradition from Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey to Heidegger 
and Gadamer. This tradition has labored against the importation of reduc­
tionist methods from nonhumanistic disciplines for the understanding of 
literary texts and other works of art. While this prohibition has rightly 
preserved the truth-bearing integrity of creative works, it has wrongly 
insulated the interpretation of these works from a full and critical evalu­
ation of their origins and interactions with structures of domination and
15. Paul Ricoeur, “Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,” Harvard Theologi­
cal Review 70 (1977): 26.
16. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings, ed. David 
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 166.
17. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and 
Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 300-311.
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oppression. Ricoeur has learned from Jurgen Habermas that a pure con­
versational model for textual understanding is not enough in the face 
of the systematic distortions that undermine open dialogue and under­
standing. Here again Ricoeur articulates the need for both rehabilitative 
and critical interpretive gestures; no text is free from ideological distor­
tion, and a romantic hermeneutic that blunts the uncovering of such bias 
is dangerously short-sighted.^® In order for a fusion between text-world 
and the reader’s world to be efficacious, no critical explanatory device 
should be excluded from the interpretation process as long as that de­
vice does not in principle deny the ontological potential of the work in 
question. Ricoeur’s consistent motto, succinctly expressed in his recent 
work, is “[T]o explain more is to understand better.”^’ Though mindful of 
the hermeneutical tradition’s truth-claims concerning aesthetic media, Ri­
coeur replaces their “short route” of direct access to Being with his “long 
detours” of successive methodological requirements for understanding 
works of art.
The Recovery of Narrative
I have suggested that The Sytnbolistn of Evil (as well as other works from 
the 1950s and early 1960s) inaugurates an expansion beyond the analysis 
of the structure of the divided will so characteristic of Ricoeur’s immediate 
postwar writings: a hermeneutic of opaque symbols is now grafted onto the 
phenomenological method. Likewise, The Rule of Metaphor marks a shift 
from Ricoeur’s earlier depth readings of myth and symbol to a general in­
terpretation theory that presses a variety of reductive hermeneutics into the 
service of a more complicated philosophical anthropology. “Today I should 
be less inclined to limit hermeneutics to the discovery of hidden meanings in 
symbolic language and would prefer to link hermeneutics to the more gen­
eral problem of written language and texts. Ricoeur’s writings from the 
1980s to the present signify still a third stage in his itinerary: the challenge 
of narratology and deconstruction. The current major texts include Time 
and Narrative (3 vols., 1983-85; Eng. trans. 1984-88), Lectures on Ideol­
ogy and Utopia (1986), and Oneself as Another (1990; Eng. trans. 1992). 
He has also authored papers that have been collected as Essays on Biblical 
Interpretation (1980), Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981), From 
Text to Action (1986; Eng. trans. 1991), A Ricoeur Reader; Reflection and
18. See Ricoeur’s mediation of the debate between Gadamer’s use of German romanticism 
and Habermas’s critical philosophy in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” in 
Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 63-100.
19. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 3 vols., trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984-88), 2:32.
20. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, 317.
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Imagination (1991), and Lectures (3 vols., 1991-1994). With these recent 
works in mind a distinctive pattern can be traced in Ricoeur’s oeuvre. His 
thought has followed a trajectory from his initial analysis of the bad will 
and the power of symbolic language to a comprehensive hermeneutical 
model now complemented by an emerging theory concerning the role of 
narrative in the formation of subjectivity.
“[T]ime becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after 
the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent 
that it portrays the features of temporal experience. The importance of 
narrative in understanding human temporality is the leitmotif of Ricoeur’s 
recent thought. His previous work had spoken to the power of myths, sym­
bols, and other figurative discourses in the mediation of consciousness; his 
current work argues that the desire to be, the task of existence, is insep­
arable from the scripting of an individual story that gathers together the 
untold and sometimes repressed narrative fragments constitutive of per­
sonal identity. Everyone needs a story to live by in order to make sense 
of the pastiche of one’s life. Without a narrative a person’s life is merely a 
random sequence of unrelated events: birth and death are inscrutable, tem­
porality is a terror and a burden, and suffering and loss remain mute and 
unintelligible.
Ricoeur’s use of narrative as a solution to the problem of identity is 
founded on the dialectic between history and fiction analyzed in Time and 
Narrative. While he recognizes the differences between history and fiction, 
he argues that both forms of writing are united by their common reference 
to the fundamentally historical and temporal character of human existence. 
One may think of history and fiction as presenting opposing referential 
claims: history intends a lawlike description of past events, while fiction 
refers to the unrealities of the imagination that bear little relationship to 
everyday life. Ricoeur rejects this dichotomy and argues instead that “in 
spite of the evident differences in the way that history and fiction are re­
lated to ‘reality’—in whatever sense of the word—they refer nonetheless, 
each in its own way, to the same fundamental feature of our individual 
and social existence. This feature is characterized in very different philoso­
phies by the term ‘historicity,’ which signifies the fundamental and radical 
fact that we make history, that we are immersed in history, that we are 
historical beings. He continues that history and fiction share a common 
narrative structure with a shared reference to the field of human action. 
The concept of plot—or rather “emplotment,” as he prefers—is the link­
ing idea that holds together both forms of writing. Emplotment is the art
21. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:3.
22. Paul Ricoeur, “The Narrative Function,
274.
in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,
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of “eliciting a pattern from a successionit is the ability to configure 
episodic and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality. The plot 
sets up a sequence of events and characters, whether real or imaginary, in a 
certain directed movement under the control of a particular point of view. 
Emplotment is a historical or literary text’s capacity to set forth a story that 
combines the givens of contingent historical existence with the possibilities 
of a meaningful interpretation of the whole.
Ricoeur’s thesis concerning the role of emplotment as the underlying 
principle of both history and fiction challenges some fundamental assump­
tions. First, history contains more “fiction” than a positivist model of 
history would allow. Insofar as history is a form of writing that seeks coher­
ence in the chaos of real events, and not simply a disconnected recounting 
of these events, history, like fiction, is governed by a wide variety of dif­
ferent aesthetic strategies for organizing past events into a narrative whole. 
“In other words, history is both a literary artefact (and in this sense a fic­
tion) and a representation of reality”^'* Historical events are recounted in 
many different forms—from relatively objective annals and chronicles to 
full-fledged narratives and highly embellished stories—all of which, by defi­
nition, emplot what is recounted according to a certain viewpoint as to the 
proper configuration, or “meaning,” of the events in question.
Second, as history is, in a manner of speaking, “fictional,” so fiction 
is more “real” than is often recognized. Fictional narratives on the order 
of a novel or play have the capacity to redescribe features of human 
historicity by bracketing ordinary descriptions of reality. The aim of an 
imaginative text is the creative imitation of human action—even as the pur­
pose of metaphor, as we saw above, is to redescribe the actual world in 
terms of possibility. Yet while narrative fiction’s mimetic capacities are cre­
ative—they do not offer slavish copies of the ordinary world—they remain 
historically rooted in the common world of human action. Ricoeur para­
doxically writes that “because history is tied to the contingent it misses the 
essential, whereas poetry, not being the slave of the real event, can address 
itself directly to the universal, i.e., to what a certain kind of person would 
likely or necessarily say or do.”^^ Narrative fictions do have a certain truth- 
value by virtue of their claim to assert something about reality—even if this 
assertion is on the order of an imaginative variation on the possibilities of 
everyday existence. Thus both history and fiction (as ideal types) share a
23. Paul Ricoeur, “Narrative and Hermeneutics,” in Essays on Aesthetics: Perspectives on 
the Work of Monroe C. Beardsley, ed. John Fisher (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1983), 
153.
24. Ricoeur, “The Narrative Function,” 291. See also Ricoeur’s qualified endorsement of 
different narrativist models of history in Time and Narrative, 1:121-74.
25. Paul Ricoeur, “Can Fictional Narratives Be True?” Analecta Husserliana 14 (1983): 
16.
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common narrative interest in describing what reality is (so history) or in re­
describing what reality is like (so fiction) to the end that our being-in-time 
and being-in-history might be rendered meaningful.
Analogously, Ricoeur maintains in Oneself as Another that the construc­
tion of a life-story is necessary to give shape and meaning to one’s existence. 
Storytelling helps make sense of the disparate parts of one’s experience. 
Each life is a medley of inchoate events waiting to be told in a comprehen­
sive format; each life is an incipient story waiting to be rendered intelligible 
by a narrator. In scripting a life-story as one’s own, a self is born in posses­
sion of a refigured identity. To write a life, or to tell a life, is to wager that 
an exegesis of the self’s untold story will pay rich dividends in one’s quest 
for authenticity and integrity.
According to Ricoeur, the solution to the problem of personal iden­
tity rests in the distinction between identity as sameness (or idem-identity) 
and identity as selfhood (or ipse-identity). Idem signifies identity as self- 
subsisting permanence and uninterrupted continuity over the span of one’s 
life. Ipse stands for the struggle to faithfully interpret one’s life by a sub­
ject that is continually refiguring itself through the stories it appropriates 
as its own. In the first case, identity is a fait accompli; in the second, 
a hermeneutical process with no a priori resolution. Generally, however, 
the notion of identity is used equivocatively, or with primary reference to 
identity as sameness, with the result that the self is understood founda- 
tionally in terms of the Cartesian cogito, a fixed substratum that perdures 
over time.^® This entitative notion of the self generates both historicist and 
physicalist criticisms, neither of which is finally satisfactory according to 
Ricoeur. Some anticogito thinkers (for example, Michel Foucault) contend 
that insofar as there is no nonverbal core self, then the subject is noth­
ing other than the sum total of the discourses practiced by its particular 
culture. Similarly, some analytic philosophers (for example, Derek Parfit), 
who also criticize Cartesian essentialism, argue that the subject is reducible 
(without remainder) to its brain states and bodily functions. Ricoeur rejects 
all three options—foundationalist, historicist, and physicalist—in favor of 
a narrative hermeneutic of the subject. The self, as neither a fixed entity, 
cultural cipher, nor biochemical remainder cobbles together its identity by 
constructing a life-story that uses the resources of various narrative frag­
ments. In the narrative interpretation of a life both history and fiction are 
borrowed from; and since the references of both genres crisscross the plane 
of human historicity, a life mediated by stories is a “fictive history, or if 
one prefers, an historic fiction. We have seen that because narrative fic-
26. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, traris. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: Univ. of Chi­
cago Press, 1992), 1-39 and passim. For a summary of the argument, see Paul Ricoeur, 
“Narrative Identity,” Philosophy Today 35 (1991): 73-81.
27. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 114.
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tions are imitations of human action, they can be relied upon as paradigms 
for answering the question, Who am I? The “who” who asks this ques­
tion must take the long route to selfhood through the “vast laboratory 
of thought experiments” available to the subject in cultural stories and 
symbols.^®
Is there a religious subtext to this argument? Ricoeur says “no” in the 
interest of preserving the autonomy and integrity of both philosophy and 
theology: just as he does not want Oneself as Another to be accused of 
cryptotheology, he does not want theology founded on biblical faith to 
ground itself on any cryptophilosophy. With this “conflict of the faculties” 
proviso stated, however, he then teases the reader, as he often does, by go­
ing on to adumbrate what a theology of the narrative self would look like 
given his thesis. In the manner of Levinas, for example, he suggests that 
such a theology would articulate the ways in which the self is summoned 
by the other (be it the divine or human other) to realize its desire to be 
by responding to the voice of the other.^^ The call of the human other, 
the neighbor, for justice and compassion secures the ethical and political 
aspects of forging a narrative identity. This prescriptive dimension of self­
hood brings to light one of the many valences of the book’s title: my self is 
constituted by the other who calls me to responsibility.
In analyzing how the self hears and responds to this call, however, a 
theology of the refigured self should not take false refuge in any putative 
metaphysical certainties concerning the nature of the “self” who is ad­
dressed. Rather, such a theology would rely on the fragile testimonies to 
divine graciousness within the biblical literatures and eschew the pseudo­
security provided by attempts to prove the reality of God, or found the 
self, on the basis of some onto-theological amalgam. “The dependence of 
the self on a word that strips it of its glory, all the while comforting its 
courage to be, delivers biblical faith from the temptation, which I am here 
calling cryptophilosophical, of taking over the henceforth vacant role of 
ultimate foundation.”®® Thus the theology briefly sketched out in Oneself 
as Another is a theology of the summoned self—the self that relies on the 
self-divesting word of the other in order to repossess itself by following the 
“true fictions” biblical faith offers to the reader-disciple.
The role of figurative texts in the formation of human subjectivity is the 
unifying theme that underlies Ricoeur’s writing. In this vein, he envisions re­
ligious studies as a hermeneutical inquiry into the imaginative potential of 
myth, symbol, and story to aid our efforts to exist with integrity. Religious
28. Ibid., 148. .
29. For the role of the other in identity formation, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and 
Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1969). Ricoeur’s use of 
Levinas is developed in Oneself tis Another, 188—90 and 335—56.
30. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 25.
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traditions use ontologically potent language and imagery to illuminate all 
that ultimately concerns human beings—our questions about life’s meaning, 
our confrontations with death, our struggles to be at home in the universe. 
Our individual and corporate worlds remain underdeveloped and impov­
erished because we no longer have a public symbolic language that speaks 
both to the brokenness and the intimations of transcendence in our lives. 
Through hermeneutics of reduction and retrieval, Ricoeur shows how the 
world’s cultural classics (including the Bible) can expansively figure rich and 
full projections of another way of being in the world that liberates what is 
essential by suggesting what is possible.
Outline of This Anthology
The essays collected in this volume comprise the most comprehensive over­
view of Ricoeur’s writings in religion. Most of these essays have not been 
previously anthologized in a volume devoted to Ricoeur’s work. While 
perhaps a few of the essays will be familiar to readers, the bulk of this 
collection is not well known in the English-speaking world. David Pellauer 
has translated many of the essays included here expressly for this volume. 
The anthology consists of writings from 1970 to the present; except in 
Part Two, the essays in each section are arranged in chronological order. 
Though the collection focuses on the religious aspects of Ricoeur’s recent 
thought, it also serves as an introduction to many of his other interests 
because his religious writings are always situated in close relation to the 
wide variety of general philosophical topics that occupy his inquiries. These 
collected essays constitute a rich and diverse body of thought that comple­
ments Ricoeur’s writings in a variety of other fields, including philosophy, 
psychology, literary criticism, and historiography. As such this collection 
fills a lacuna in Ricoeur scholarship in particular, and contemporary reli­
gious and philosophical thought in general, by surveying the full range of 
Ricoeur’s recent religious writings in chronological and thematic fashion. 
This approach allows the reader to trace the development of his thought 
from his midcareer use of discourse analysis for understanding religious 
language, to his subsequent concern with the role of narrative in the study 
of biblical genres, to his more recent inquiries into models of personal iden­
tity and the relevance of continental philosophers such as Rosenzweig and 
Levinas to the contemporary task of theological reflection.
To speak of “development” in Ricoeur’s thought is to speak of exten­
sions of, rather than fundamental breaks with, the themes and concerns 
of his previous writings. I have suggested one such recurrent emphasis 
in his overall philosophical project: the power of religious language to 
metamorphize the world of the reader by opening up new possibilities
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of being-in-the-world. What is distinctive about his specifically religious 
writings is the regional application of this theme to the role of scriptural 
discourses—including narratives, laws, prophecies, wisdom writings, and 
hymns—as occasions for challenging the reader to alternative forms of 
existence.
In this vein, the particular genre that Ricoeur returns to again and 
again in these essays is biblical narrative by way of his studies of narra- 
tology in general. Yet he uses and understands narrative differently from 
the way many theologians use and understand narrative in the contempo­
rary setting. His concern is to show how the stories of the Bible are not 
one-dimensional exercises in concordance and triumph but rather multiva­
lent points of intersection for a variety of discourses and their contrasting 
theological itineraries. He demonstrates how much of the Bible’s narrative 
and nonnarrative material speaks as readily to the ambiguity and futility of 
existence as it does to the providence of God within covenant and history. 
Ricoeur’s use of—and caution against—narrative for theological reflection 
places him on the fringes of the camp of narrative theology per se, if by 
that phrase we mean the privileging of biblical narrative as the means to 
redescribing “reality within the scriptural framework rather than translat­
ing Scripture into extrascriptural categories.”^^ Ricoeur is wary of assigning 
final priority to any one particular construal of reality because all forms of 
literary discourse (and not only biblical narrative discourse) can potentially 
refigure one’s experience and offer new possibilities for understanding. Any 
genred text that works figurative variations on reality by proposing an 
imaginative “world” that the reader might inhabit can be said to be “re­
vealed.” While the biblical stories are a medium of revelation, they are a 
species of a wider revelatory function that can be participated in by any 
text (biblical or otherwise) that unleashes novel alternatives for the reader.
Part One
The first part consists of Ricoeur’s general explorations into the nature of 
religion. He uses methodological tools from history of religions and liter­
ary criticism to analyze the articulations of religious belief through symbol 
and discourse. While he does not go so far as to argue that religion is a 
sui generis phenomenon, he does maintain that religious beliefs have their 
own integrity and should not be reduced to explanatory schemas that fail 
to account for the self-understandings of religious communities. To facili­
tate the understanding of religion “on its own terms” Ricoeur argues, in 
a manner similar to Ludwig Wittgenstein, that just insofar as religious be-
31. George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal 
Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), 118.
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lief and experience are primarily expressed through various discourses, the 
study of religion should begin with analyzing these modes of articulation. 
“[W]hatever ultimately may be the nature of the so-called religious expe­
rience, it comes to language, it is articulated in a language, and the most 
appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to inquire into its 
linguistic expression.
In one of the articles collected here, “Philosophy and Religious Lan­
guage,” Ricoeur shows how different modes of signification—symbols, 
myths, narratives, metaphors, and models—generate a surplus of meaning 
in the study of religious texts. These literary forms of articulation are not 
simply taxonomic devices for categorizing discourse but rather the means 
by which theological meaning is produced. These forms are not merely 
“decorative [with] an emotional value but no informative value.”^^ Modes 
of discourse, then, are more than just classificatory codes or ornamen­
tal trappings because the content of religious discourse is determined by 
the literary forms employed to mediate particular theological understand­
ings. The scriptural figuration of the divine life, for example, is radically 
problematized by attention to the mixed genres employed by the biblical 
writers. “Throughout these discourses, God appears differently each time: 
sometimes as the hero of the saving act, sometimes as wrathful and com­
passionate, sometimes as the one to whom one can speak in a relation of 
an I-Thou type, or sometimes as the one whom I meet only in a cosmic 
order that ignores me.”^‘* The advantage of using discourse analysis for 
understanding religious texts is that it renders more complicated and het­
erogeneous the interpretation of biblical faith. In this approach the Bible 
emerges as an asymmetrical intertext of oppositional genres—genres that 
alternately complement and conflict with one another—rather than a stable 
book unified by a particular discourse or singular perspective.
While discourse analysis aids the interpretation of biblical literature, 
comparative history of religions enables a broader understanding of re­
ligious phenomena that includes textual as well as nontextual modes of 
experience. In “Manifestation and Proclamation” and “The ‘Sacred’ Text 
and the Community,” Ricoeur takes up the dialectic between the phe­
nomenology of the sacred and the hermeneutic of the word in world 
spirituality. Primordial religious communities are founded on numinous, 
preverbal experiences of the sacred in nature and the cosmos, while latter- 
day, book-centered traditions are formed by belief in an intratribal deity 
and subscription to a body of iconoclastic teachings. In manifestation 
communities, religious truth and meaning are universally rooted in the
32. Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” below, 35.
33. Paul Ricoeur, “Poetique et symbolique,” in Initiation a la pratique de la theologie, 
vol. 1: Introduction, ed. Bernard Lauret and Francois Refoule (Paris: Cerf, 1982), 48.
34. Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” below, 41.
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correspondences between agricultural cycles and divine power, while in 
proclamation traditions truth and meaning are authoritatively defined by 
revealed texts that warn against any manifestation of the Wholly Other 
through nature and the image.
Equally important are the distinctive temporalities characteristic of the 
two types. This is the difference between backward-looking archaic time as 
repetitive of the original cosmogony, and forward-oriented historical time 
as the progressive anticipation of a better future. Ricoeur argues that if 
these two notions of time are bifurcated into ideal types, then the one is 
aesthetic, generic, cyclical, and nature-bound while the other is ethical, par­
ticular, interruptive, and history-based. Lest this opposition harden into a 
false dichotomy, however, Ricoeur avers that biblical religion is actually a 
recombination of both temporalities; it oscillates between the celebration 
of “cyclical” festivals and seasons and the testimony of the word in “lin­
ear” history. One of the themes, then, of Part One is the need for biblical 
religion continually to combine the clarifying precision of the word m his­
tory and the cyclical modalities of the sacred in nature. Moreover, unless 
proclamation traditions reactualize the rootedness of all life in sacred pat­
terns and symbols, these traditions will be empty of the power and mystery 
that primordial people experienced in their recurring encounters with the 
numinous. “In truth, without the support and renewing power of the sa­
cred cosmos and the sacredness of vital nature, the word itself becomes 
abstract and cerebral.
These initial articles highlight Ricoeur’s intensive debate with Mircea 
Eliade on the question of the phenomenology of comparative religions. 
Ricoeur was a colleague of Eliade’s at the University of Chicago Divinity 
School until Eliade’s death in 1984. While Ricoeur is greatly indebted to 
Eliade for his perspicacious studies of primordial traditions, he questions 
his lack of attention to the primacy of proclamation in religions founded 
on a revealed scripture. “In Christianity there is a polarity of proclamation 
and manifestation, which Mircea Eliade does not recognize in his homo­
geneous concept of manifestation, epiphany, and so forth----1 think there
is something specific in the Hebraic and Christian traditions that gives a 
kind of privilege to the word.”^^ Ricoeur borrows from Eliade (as well 
as from Rudolph Otto and others) the notion that the universe is charged 
with the power of the sacred; the universe signifies the numinous through 
symbols and myths rooted in the depth structures of reality itself. But he 
takes issue with the deployment of Eliadean analysis at the expense of an 
equally powerful hermeneutic of the capacity of scriptural texts to open up 
new dimensions of reality that often challenge the established patterns of
35. Ricoeur, “Manifestation and Proclamation,” below, 67.
36. Ricoeur, “The ‘Sacred’ Text and the Community,” below, 71.
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the sacred universe. While canonical texts need the sustenance of primor­
dial symbolism, the power of such texts cannot be sufficiently accounted 
for by a comparative phenomenology inattentive to the distinctiveness of 
word-based religious traditions.
Part Two
The three essays selected for this part represent Ricoeur’s close readings 
of the important works about religion by Kant, Rosenzweig, and Levinas. 
These essays are not freestanding position papers by Ricoeur but rather 
critical engagements with different philosophical approaches to religion ac­
cording to their major practitioners. Ricoeur’s own constructive position on 
various questions is painstakingly worked out by way of expositing each 
thinker’s approach and usually is explicitly delineated only toward the end 
of each essay.
The essay on Kant forms a natural pair with an earlier essay on Hegel. 
The two articles give alternative answers to the question of whether the 
proper aim of philosophy of religion is to secure the idea of God as a spec­
ulative concept free of figurative thought, or whether its aim is to avoid 
speculative theorizing in order to enable the practical realization of human 
freedom. For Hegel, the inner dynamism of thought concerning the figures 
and symbols of religion leads to a sublation (Aufhebuttg) of such figures in 
pure conceptual thought where Spirit is self-conscious to itself. For Kant, 
on the other hand, the final absorption of figurative religious thought into 
speculation is not the dialectical realization of reason’s inner directional­
ity but rather a transcendental illusion that should be vigorously resisted. 
Such an illusion is a violation of the boundaries of reason within the con­
fines of conceptually mediated sense experience. Insofar as Ricoeur upholds 
the integrity of figurative modes of religious discourse against attempts to 
translate such discourse into a speculative metalanguage, his sympathies lie 
more with Kant’s philosophy of limits than with Hegel’s system of absolute 
knowledge.
In the essay on Hegel, Ricoeur’s purpose is to examine both the evolution 
of the role of figurative thinking (Vorstellung) in Hegel’s religious thought 
and to establish whether such thinking is finally dissolved into concep­
tual thought (Begriff) devoid of pictorial imagery. In the Phenomenology 
of Spirit, Hegel puts the stress on the inadequacy of religious Vorstellung 
to apprehend its subject matter; for this reason religious picture-thinking 
must endure a continual process of self-realization until it reaches its final
37. See Paul Ricoeur, “The Status of ‘Vorstellung’ in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” in 
Meaning, Truth, and God, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.; Univ. of Notre Dame 
Press, 1982), 70-88. On Ricoeur’s dialogue with Kant and Hegel, see also his argument for 
a “post-Hegelian return to Kant” in “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 136-45.
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consummation in conceptual thought. Prior to its final realization, this dy­
namic inner process reaches its religious climax in Christianity just insofar 
as Christ is the perfect symbol of the self-consciousness of Spirit in and 
through its other. But because thought about this symbol remains rooted in 
historical imagery, it is only partially aware of the meaning of the Spirit in 
and for itself, and so it must be sublated by conceptual thought.
Ricoeur argues, however, that in spite of Hegel’s generally negative eval­
uation of religious Vorstellung in the Phenomenology, figurative thinking 
carries a more positive valence in Hegel’s later Berlin Lectures on the Phi­
losophy of Religion. The reason for this change is that the subject matter 
of the Vorstellung in question changes: the focus on biblical and christolog- 
ical imagery in the earlier work gives way to a valorization of the doctrine 
of the Trinity in the later work as a more adequate (albeit religious) form 
of speculation about Spirit. The idea of the Trinity—the interrelationship 
of Father, Son, and Spirit in and for each—discloses the dynamic nature 
of reality itself. Thus in the Berlin Lectures this idea mediates between the 
inadequacy of religious pictorial thinking and the superiority of concep­
tual thought. “Between the trinitarian expression of Christian thought and 
the high dialectic of conceptual thinking there is a homology that exceeds 
the shortcomings of pictorial thinking.”^® Ricoeur ends the essay by argu­
ing for the importance of conceptual rigor in philosophy of religion, but 
without disparaging (as Hegel often does, and especially in the Phenom­
enology) the narrative and figurative dimensions of religious discourses that 
have founded communities of faith and hope. As Hegel seems to call for at 
the end of his Berlin Lectures, Ricoeur says that only when philosophy is 
nourished by the figurative ideals of a culture’s sacred texts can it fulfill its 
destiny as a medium for insight and understanding.
In the essay on Kant included here, Ricoeur maintains that Kant’s phi­
losophy of religion is a hermeneutic of symbols exercised outside the 
parameters of his critical philosophy. The reason for the exteriority of reli­
gion to philosophy stems from the problem of the “bound will,” a problem 
that is not approachable on the basis of the methodology in the three Cri­
tiques. Kant argues that while an originary disposition to evil is basic to 
the human condition, this disposition can only be indirectly “thought” by 
interrogating the figures and myths of religious belief; it cannot be directly 
“known” as an element of objective knowledge and experience.
Ricoeur’s analysis of Kant’s fundamental anthropology in Religion 
within the Limits of Reason Alone hews to the line of Ricoeur’s own discus­
sion of the innately faulted character of human volition in his earlier poetics 
of the will. Humans suffer from the loss of free will—from a propensity 
to evil even though the actual performance of evil is a result of free choice
38. Ibid., 85.
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rather than “original sin.” Evil, then, is our predilection but also our re­
sponsibility; we are both victimized by it and culpable for it. “We might 
say, supporting Kant, that he has identified what is so upsetting in the con­
fession of evil—I do not say the experience of evil—namely, the following
paradox: in each instance, we do evil; but evil was already there__ [Kant]
caught sight of the paradox of something that has always been there and 
yet for which we ourselves are responsible.”^^ Kant’s response to this para­
dox is drawn from what Ricoeur aptly calls the “dramaturgy” of biblical 
Christology where Christ, as the supreme archetype of a person who fully 
lives the moral law, is pictured as victorious over a cosmically evil antag­
onist. The value of this archetype lies in its ability to figure the will (and 
thereby liberate it from its predisposition to evil), not in its reference to the 
life of the historical Jesus. In this sense we should say that the origin of the 
Christ symbol is not in a historical event but in the figurative powers of the 
moral imagination. The archetype is generated by a “schematism of hope” 
in which the rational concept of a will no longer bound by evil inclinations 
is rendered intelligible and applicable to experience by the concrete exam­
ple of an individual who singularly embodies the autonomy of a rational 
will. Again, however, Ricoeur is quick to underscore that this archetype 
in Kant is a figure of the imagination and not an extension of objective 
knowledge into the inner workings of Reality itself (contra Hegel). “The 
archetype of a humanity well pleasing to God can be admitted only as a 
practical ideal, not as a reflective moment of the absolute itself.”''®
Kant frankly admits that the origin of evil is inscrutable and that only 
the infusion of supernatural grace (figured by the Christ symbol) can free 
the bad will. While Kant insists on the importance of these two affirmations 
for liberating the will, he does not try to reconcile them to his earlier critical 
philosophy. By the same token, such confessionalist statements do not con­
tradict the critical philosophy since they clearly fall outside the boundaries 
of critical reason. Ricoeur concludes that Kant’s adroit use of a variety of 
religious figures (Vorstellung) to interrogate the nature of human volition is 
the key to the success of his project. Whereas Hegel argues that Vorstellung 
in religion is inadequate to the concept of pure Spirit, Kant maintains that 
the more limited task of interpreting the rich imagery of religious faith has 
potential for enabling the practical realization of human freedom. Ricoeur 
argues that this is the burden that should be carried by all philosophy of 
religion: the explication of figures of hope as a response to the avowal of 
radical evil.
The essay on Rosenzweig and that on Levinas can also be read in asso­
ciation with each other. In the Rosenzweig essay, Ricoeur’s basic interest is
39. Ricoeur, “A Philosophical Hermeneutics of Religion: Kant,” below, 79.
40. Ibid., 85.
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in the meaning of the rhetorical figures that underpin Rosenzweig’s philos­
ophy of Judaism in The Star of Redemption. For Ricoeur the book’s central 
figure is the six-pointed Star of David. This figure generates a wide range of 
significations: its upward triangle stands for God at its peak with the world 
and humanity at its lower angles, while its downward triangle connects the 
modalities of creation, revelation, and redemption—the central themes that 
form the structure of the book’s first and second parts. But the star is also 
a figure of the face, both the face of humanity and the face of God. (Here 
Ricoeur notes in French the affinity between figure, or form, and visage, or 
face.) Insofar as the “physiognomy” of the six-pointed star can be under­
stood analogically in relation to a “face” with forehead, eyes, nose, mouth, 
and so on, and insofar as the face makes an absolute demand on one’s eth­
ical obligations, Ricoeur regards the figure/face of the star in Rosenzweig 
as the master trope for understanding both the interhuman as well as the 
God-human relationship.
Ricoeur argues that the centrality of the figure of the star in Rosenzweig 
positions Rosenzweig’s project closer to Levinas than Hegel. Ricoeur reads 
the Star as an extended metaphor where figuration (rather than specula­
tion, as in Hegel) is privileged as the primary medium for philosophical 
insight. “It might even be more fruitful to compare the tie between figure 
and speculation for Rosenzweig to the relation of Vorstellung (representa­
tion) and Begriff (concept) for Hegel. We might then see that the relation is 
something quite other than what Hegel meant. With Rosenzweig we would 
have a speculation that is metaphorical throughout, a metaphorics that is 
speculative throughout.In the register of a sustained “metaphorics,” Ri­
coeur highlights two concepts that tie together Rosenzweig’s and Levinas’s 
thought: the epiphany of the face and the criticism of totality. On the one 
hand, both thinkers maintain that the other’s face generates within the sub­
ject a compelling sense of responsibility for the other’s welfare; on the other, 
they criticize the penchant of Western philosophers for subordinating all 
experience to absolute reason. Ricoeur concludes by noting, however, that 
while Levinas appears successful at escaping the sirens of totalizing philoso­
phy, it is less clear whether Rosenzweig, with his facility for system building 
as demonstrated by the architectonic elegance of the Star, has completely 
abandoned the all-encompassing idealism he purports to have disavowed.
In the final essay of this section, Ricoeur considers the notion of “tes­
timony” in Levinas’s thought in relation to the themes of height and 
exteriority in Heidegger, Jean Nabert, and Levinas. He argues that a read­
ing together” of these three thinkers shows an increasing reliance on the 
dimensions of height and exteriority culminating in Levinas’s philosophy 
of the other. At first glance Heidegger seems to assign importance to these
41. Ricoeur, “The ‘Figure’ in Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption,” below, 97.
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two elements. The subject is never coincident with itself and must rely on a 
voice “beyond itself” in order to be itself; but this is the voice of conscience 
within the subject and is not finally exterior to the subject. Likewise, Hei­
degger s reference to the value of others exterior to oneself is ultimately 
subsumed by the notion of the uncanny and the pernicious effects of be­
ing in relation to the “they.” Ricoeur criticizes Heidegger’s philosophy as 
characterized by an exteriority without otherness [that] corresponds to 
this height without transcendence. Nabert fares better than Heidegger 
in Ricoeur’s analysis because Nabert argues for a self-divested subject who 
testifies to the absolute beyond itself and who can recover its own dignity 
and identity only by means of this exterior testimony. Ricoeur then analyzes 
Levinas’s full turn to the transcendence and alterity of the other in rela­
tion to the subject. For Levinas, subjectivity consists in existing through the 
other and for the other. To take responsibility for the other, even hostage 
oneself to the other, is the vocation of true selfhood. In the end, however, 
Ricoeur returns to Nabert’s philosophy of consciousness as a needed coun­
terpart to Levinas’s thoroughgoing stress on responsibility for the other. 
Ricoeur avers that self-identity is not merely a result of one’s response to 
the call of the other; it is also what must be presupposed for the call to be 
heard and understood in the first place.
Part Three
Even though Parts Three and Four announce two sometimes unrelated top­
ics exegesis and theology—both of these sections form a coherent whole 
in Ricoeur’s development of a biblically informed theology. I have divided 
the parts for heuristic purposes, but the interests of each part constitute 
the dual foci of a single ellipse. For Ricoeur the disciplines of biblical inter­
pretation and theological reflection operate within the same gravitational 
space; the complementary and contrasting genres of Hebrew and Chris­
tian Scriptures. Theology, first and foremost, is a hermeneutical exercise 
at work upon the multiple modes of discourse within the Bible. Closer to 
exegesis than philosophy, theology is a nonspeculative interpretation of the 
founding discourses of Jewish and Christian faith without the benefit of any 
rational foundation upon which to base such an enterprise. The temptation 
of theology has always been to ignore its rootedness in the originary—albeit 
provincial—languages of biblical religion in favor of a more philosophical 
orientation. As rational thought-about-God, theology would then be able 
to justify itself as an independent exercise in reason and argument and go 
beyond its provenance in the peculiar imagery and language of religious
42. Ricoeur, “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker of Testimony,” below, 110.
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faith. Ricoeur, however, rejects this homology between theology and phi­
losophy and argues instead for the reinvigoration of theological discourse 
on the basis of biblical hermeneutics. Theology, then, is biblical theology 
but not in the sense that that phrase is often understood with reference to 
neoorthodox thought, as we will see below.
Part 3 brings together Ricoeur’s various exegetical writings. The four 
essays that have been selected are examples of his theory of biblical her­
meneutics as well as case studies of his actual readings of biblical texts 
Though a philosopher, Ricoeur seeks to avoid theory-heavy methods of 
biblical reading in favor of a text-immanent approach that projects pos­
sibilities of meaning occasioned by the texts themselves. “The question is 
rather whether there is, before the philosophical-theological interpretation, 
an interpretation that would not be an interpretation of the text or an inter­
pretation about the text, but an interpretation in the text and through the 
text.”'*^ This intrinsic approach is governed by sensitivity to the traditions 
of interpretation already at work within the texts under consideration. The 
Bible for Ricoeur is a multilayered mass of disparate literary traditions; a 
successful hermeneutic plumbs the depths of these textual strata and brings 
to light dimensions of sedimented meaning previously hidden and opaque^ 
He alternately refers to this excavation process as a depth semantics, 
a “semiotics of texts,”'*^ or a “synchronic reading [that] complete[s] the 
diachronic approach of the historical-critical method.”^" Whatever the sta­
tus of the recounted events in the Bible as historical occurrences, these 
events now enjoy a textual existence at some remove from their antecedent 
origins. Their meaning is now a product of their inscription within a net­
work of texts that alternately support and displace one another in an 
intertextual whole. Whatever their original Sitz-im-Leben, it is now the me­
diation of these events through the Sitz-im-Wort of various literary genres 
that constitutes their present-day significance. Historical criticism can help- 
fully reconstruct the probable historical “occasions” that generated later 
literary traditions, but only a synchronic study of the interanimating con­
junctions and dislocations between various modes of discourse can explain 
the complexities of meaning within the Bible.
In conversation with both structuralist (Vladimir Propp) and formalist 
(A.-J. Greimas) analysts, Ricoeur’s semiotic approach considers the codes 
and oppositions that govern the transformations at work in the biblical 
texts. In “On the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1—2:4a,” he isolates the theme of 
separation as the literary convention that structures the opening creation 
hymn into a series of dynamic oppositions: order and chaos, night and
43. Ricoeur, “On the Exegesis of Genesis 1:1—2:4a,” below, 140.
44. Ibid.
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day, plants and animals. This approach sets up a nature-centered rather 
than human-centered reading of the Genesis story. Such an interpretation 
clashes with the historical approach of the neoorthodox biblical theology 
movement (inspired by thinkers such as Karl Barth and Gerhard von Rad) 
that subordinated the creation account to the role of a prologue within the 
overall narrative space of the Hexateuch. Apropos to this Heilsgeschichte 
orientation, the creation of humankind is the crowning high point of the 
creation story. Ricoeur disagrees with the neoorthodox approach, however, 
and argues instead for a literary interpretation of the Priestly creation story 
that construes the story as an ecological text. Thus Genesis 1 is best read 
as a nonanthropocentric ordering of all life-forms into a cosmic biosphere 
that precedes and envelops the salvation-history account of the Yahwist 
redactors.
At stake in this recovery of the syntactical patterns that govern the song 
of creation in Genesis is the preservation of the integrity of nonnarrative 
sensibilities vis-a-vis the overall narrative shape of the Hebrew and Chris­
tian Scriptures. While narrative constitutes the “most visible framework” 
for biblical understanding, it is always balanced by its deep connections 
with other modes of articulation.'*^ In “Biblical Time” Ricoeur argues that 
the biblical message may appear to be moderated by an extended and 
coherent unilinearity; in fact, however, progressive time is consistently frac­
tured by nonlinear modes of scriptural temporality. Indeed, the biblical time 
line of a sometimes facile covenantal history is continuously interrupted by 
the ethical demands of legal discourse, the radically open and eschatolog­
ical character of prophetic discourse, the cyclical and immemorial nature 
of wisdom writings, and so forth. The same point is made in this section’s 
other essays. Ricoeur demonstrates in his reading of the Synoptic parables 
of the wicked husbandmen and the sower and the seed in “The Bible and 
the Imagination,” and in his hermeneutic of the Gospel of Mark in “Inter­
pretive Narrative,” that the promise of a historical master story to explain 
all experience is a chimera. Both the parables and Mark’s Gospel function 
as cautionary tales against naive trust in the power of narrative emplotment 
to render intelligible the aporetic nature of experience.
This collection of Ricoeur’s essays concerning the theory and practice 
of biblical hermeneutics reflects both stability and change in his exegetical 
work over the past twenty-five years. All these works are characterized by 
the use of literary analysis over and against the regnant forms of historical 
criticism practiced then and now. But the most recent piece, entitled “Inter­
pretive Narrative,” reflects the progression in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics from 
structuralism (so characteristic of his Genesis exegesis) to poststructuralism 
(especially through his current use of the work of Frank Kermode and
47. Ibid., 179.
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John Dominic Crossan). Now not only does narrative create meaning in 
recombinations with other modes of discourse, but, moreover, in its cross­
pollinations with the counternarrative stress on secrecy and futility, it also 
subverts straight-ahead literary and theological coherence by obfuscating 
what it purports to elucidate. “Is it not the case that we must say that 
the narrative not so much elucidates things as obscures them in the sense 
that its manner of narratively interpreting the kerygma is to reinforce the 
enigmatic aspect of the events themselves?”"** In a postmodern culture, the 
pathos and promise of a Ricoeurian depth semiotics are its ability to bring 
to light the darkness and opacity that shadow even our most prized sacred 
stories.
Part Four
The essays in this section bring together Ricoeur’s theological writings with 
reference to his literary analysis of the Bible’s disparate modes of discourse. 
The irony of this collection is that while Ricoeur is well known for his theo­
logical writings, he has always been uncomfortable with being labeled a 
theologian. The reason for this discomfort is his suspicion that theologians 
(as well as philosophers) often fall prey to the tendency to homogenize the 
Bible’s semantic polyphony by way of articulating a body of speculative 
concepts divorced from the originary discourses of Jewish and Christian 
Scripture. Two of the essays in this section—“Naming God” and “Toward 
a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties stress 
how attention to biblical genre diversity is necessary for a multifaceted 
understanding of the divine life. Again the focus falls on the confluence 
of narrative and nonnarrative discourses, but now with reference to an 
enriched understanding of God. Before God is defined in univocal terms 
as Being under the control of a particular metaphysical system, Ricoeur 
maintains that God is first “named” polyphonically in the medley of di­
verse biblical genres. “The naming of God, in the originary expressions of 
faith, is not simple but multiple. It is not a single tone, but polyphonic. The 
originary expressions of faith are complex forms of discourse as diverse as 
narratives, prophecies, laws, proverbs, prayers, hymns, liturgical formulas, 
and wisdom writings. As a whole, these forms of discourse name God. But 
they do so in various ways.”"*^ Reflection alongside, not away from, this 
polyphony should be the presupposition and telos of all theological work.
The use of discourse analysis sensitizes thought about God to the zones 
of indeterminacy and irruptions of radical discontinuity within the texts 
that first “name” God for the believing community. Unfortunately, how-
48. Ricoeur, “Interpretive Narrative,” below, 199.
49. Ricoeur, “Naming God,” below, 224.
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ever, theology often proceeds as if the salvation-history paradigm it has 
created—that is, the enclosure of all reality within the creation and escha- 
ton of biblical history—is exhaustive of the full meaning of the Scriptures. 
While the Bible can be read as a seamless exercise in narrative coherence, an 
extended “Christian pattern,” such an interpretation ignores the Bible’s fete 
du sens (festival of meaning) by suppressing the disjunctions that contradict 
the seeming unity of the all-encompassing plot.^® “[TJhis ‘Christian pattern’ 
tends to abolish the peripeties, dangers, failures, and horrors of history for 
the sake of a consoling overview provided by the providential schema of 
this grandiose narrative. Concordance finally conquers discordance. Ri- 
coeur’s point, as we saw in his papers in Part Three, is that there is more 
than narrative coherence at work in the biblical naming of God—or, better, 
that it is only as narrative is interanimated by its cross-fertilizations with 
other modes of discourse that it can effectively make meaning.
This recurrent emphasis on the interplay between narrative and non­
narrative echoes a theme that appears almost as an aside at the conclusion 
of Ricoeur’s multivolume Time and Narrative. The book’s working thesis 
concerning the potential of narrative to humanize time is problematized 
by a final reflection on the temporality of wisdom discourse. The sapien­
tial literature of Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, and Lamentations challenges 
the totalizing impulses of narrative literatures that purport to emplot all 
experience on a time line with a clear beginning, middle, and end. Wisdom 
contends that life in media res is riddled with such brokenness and “vanity” 
that it can never be subsumed under the hegemony of the supreme plot— 
even the plot of the Deuteronomic History. In the contest between narrative 
and wisdom, new possibilities of being-in-time are unleashed that question 
easy resolutions of the problem of existence according to the symmetry 
of the master story. We need stories in order to make sense of temporal 
existence, but stories unaided by the tonic of wisdom degenerate into sim­
plifying life’s insoluble ambiguities. Wisdom is attuned to the fragility and 
suffering of existence in a way that narrative is not. “It is not for narra­
tive to deplore the brevity of life, the conflict between love and death, the 
vastness of a universe that pays no attention to our lament. Without 
wisdom, narrative inevitably drifts toward a triumphalism insensitive to 
the power of time to rewrite one’s personal plots—and even destroy the 
putative narrative coherence of one’s life.
The two essays on hope and evil in this section make a similar point.
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Both essays take their point of departure in the failure of Hegel s dialectic 
to subsume negativity under the optimism of absolute knowledge. Anachro- 
nistically, Ricoeur highlights the value of Kant’s attempt to break open 
Hegel’s closed system by arguing for Kant’s extension of thought beyond 
the limits of what can be known with rational certitude. It is not possible 
to know with finality whether one’s hopes are ultimately illusory or in fact 
grounded in a final resolution of life’s aporias, but the wager of religious 
hope (without the benefit of final certainty) can nevertheless be satisfying 
for the one who suffers the vagaries of aporetic existence. Correspondingly, 
this tack spells new directions for the question of theodicy; Ricoeur pro­
poses a practical response to the problem of evil, rather than a theoretical 
solution. While the “false clarity of an apparently rational explanation”” 
for unmerited suffering and evil is the standard approach to theodicy, Ri­
coeur argues that only an affective or performative confrontation of evil is 
adequate to the problem. Returning again to the power of sapiential litera­
ture he argues that wisdom is the right source for a theodicy in the mode of 
feelings and catharsis. Thus a theology in a practical register—consisting of 
mourning, complaint against God, and the exercise of faith in spite of evil— 
is the best hope for the sufferer who has moved beyond the pseudosecurity 
of onto-theological optimism and speculation.
In “The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Pro­
phetic Vocation,” Ricoeur again takes up the question of selfhood that 
underpins the bulk of his philosophical writing. This essay is the com­
panion piece to the unpublished paper entitled “The Self in the Mirror of 
Scripture,” which is not included here.” Together these two pieces were 
part of Ricoeur’s Gifford Lectures of 1986 that formed the basis of Oneself 
us Another, Ricoeur says that he has not included these essays in the larger 
volume because he wants to preserve the autonomy and integrity of two 
related, but distinctive, modes of discourse: theology and philosophy. Thus 
the “Summoned Subject” essay and its unpublished counterpart provide a 
revealing angle of vision into the religious import of the larger project of 
Oneself as Another.
The connection between Oneself us Another and the essay included here 
is most obvious in the final chapter of Oneself as Another, What Ontology 
in View?” In this chapter Ricoeur identifies conscience as the place where 
selfhood is constituted: in the interior voice of obligation each person is 
called into responsibility for oneself and the other. Conscience is a formal 
feature of existence; it is the generic capacity to discriminate between com­
peting values in one’s relations to others. In the Summoned Subject this
53. Ricoeur, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology,” below, 254.
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moral capacity is examined through the different registries of the prophetic 
vocation in the Scriptures. The prophet is the model of the “mandated sub­
ject” who works for the health of the community by responding to the call 
to withdraw from the community in order to be sent back to the same. 
Ricoeur continues that the power of conscience has other theological im­
plications as well. Indeed, conscience is now valorized as the contact point 
between the word of God and human beings. “Conscience is thus the an­
thropological presupposition without which ‘justification by faith’ would 
remain an event marked by radical extrinsicness. In this sense, conscience 
becomes the organ of the reception of the kerygma, in a perspective that 
remains profoundly Pauline.Without conscience, the voice that sum­
mons the self to its responsibilities falls on deaf ears. In Ricoeur’s earlier 
writings the imagination played the role of a sort of praeparatio evangel- 
ica for the reception of the divine word.^^ While not denying this previous 
emphasis, the focus is now on the subject’s moral capacity to select which 
figures of the imagination best enable the subject’s care and concern for the 
other. The work of imagination and the testimony of conscience together 
empower the subject to appropriate the command to take responsibility for 
the other’s welfare.
The emphasis on the summoned self marks a return to—and extension 
beyond—Ricoeur’s formative anthropological concerns in his unfinished 
trilogy on the will, but the stress now falls on the specific language of 
conscience rather than on the structures of volition in general. Perhaps we 
could say that his Gifford Lectures now complete his earlier poetics of the 
will. Again as before, the human as moral agent is both free and deter­
mined: free to exercise the autonomy of conscience but delimited since the 
subject is able to do so only within the confines of the symbolic matrixes 
that dispose the subject prior to entering consciousness. The resumption 
of the dialectic between freedom and finitude, so critical to Ricoeur’s ear­
lier trilogy, as well as the more recent analysis of conscience, reflects the 
lifelong impact of Levinas on Ricoeur’s thought. For Levinas authentic self­
hood is constituted by the self’s response to its being summoned—indeed, 
determined—by the call of the other. “But responsibility for another comes
from what is prior to my freedom__ It does not allow me to constitute
myself as an I think, substantial like a stone, or, like a heart of stone, ex­
isting in and for oneself. While Ricoeur makes clear his disagreements 
with Levinas in “Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker of Testimony” and the final 
chapter of Oneself as Another, he agrees with Levinas that the recovery of
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the phenomenon of moral agency as care for another is the fundamental 
task in the journey toward selfhood. Without the assurance of an ultimate 
foundation (religious or otherwise) upon which to found oneself, the self, 
summoned by the divine entreaty mediated by conscience, wagers that fi­
delity to this entreaty will open out to a future of expansive possibilities 
for itself and others.
Part Five
The essays in this final section consist of sermons and writings in moral the­
ology; they represent the practical extension of Ricoeur’s religious thought 
into the areas of theological ethics, interreligious dialogue, and pastoral 
care. As with his other writings, these occasional pieces set out a counter­
metaphysical approach to religious thought and praxis grounded in the 
diversity of biblical discourses. Ricoeur argues that theological ethics must 
begin with the complicated—even contradictory—expressions of virtue and 
morality within a religious tradition’s founding texts before it turns to 
a conceptual analysis of the meaning of these expressions. He criticizes 
analytic moral philosophers—from Gene Outka to John Rawls—for sys­
tematically “leveling off” the oddities and discontinuities within the Bible’s 
ethical teachings in order to iterate coherent philosophical theories of the 
good. His point is that general theoretical approaches to ethics both (1) ig­
nore biblical polysemy and (2) offer solutions to the aporetics of moral 
philosophy that are insensitive to the practical difficulties of crafting an 
ethical existence. As we saw in the previous sections, Ricoeur is consis­
tently wary of overarching theological systems that operate independently 
from their base in the primary documents of religious faith because such 
systems are ultimately false to the fractured character of human experience.
Two of the essays collected here (“Ethical and Theological Considera­
tions on the Golden Rule” and “Love and Justice”) and one of the sermons 
(“The Logic of Jesus, the Logic of God”) analyze the biblical aporia be­
tween the extravagant commandment of Jesus to love one’s enemies and 
give to the other whatever is asked for, and the rule of reciprocal justice 
that seeks to balance the other’s needs against the subject’s own welfare. 
Understood oppositionally, the gospel command to love the enemy is ex­
travagant, unilateral, asymmetric, and excessively other-directed, while the 
biblical ideal of justice is rule-governed, bilateral, reciprocal, and thought­
fully self-reflexive. Ricoeur, however, argues against allowing this polarity 
to harden into an absolute antinomy and suggests instead the need for an 
“unstable equilibrium”^® between the nonutilitarian demand to love at all
58. Ricoeur, “Love and Justice,” below, 324.
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costs and the practical efficacy of adjudicating competing interests in so­
cieties governed by the rule of law. This mediation allows for a mutual 
interpretation of each enterprise in the light of the other, so that the im­
possible command to practice pure altruism can be reintegrated, but never 
subsumed, into the reciprocal codes of social justice and penal law that 
order modern life.
The biblical teaching that forms the background of this dialectic between 
love and justice is that all human beings are codependent members of an 
originary and ongoing creation that is nurturing and benevolent. Draw­
ing from the Reformed tradition the idea of a power over all greater than 
ourselves, Ricoeur maintains that the goodness of creation under divine 
governance teaches us to be good to one another. “[W]e set in the fore­
most place the sense of our radical dependence on a power that precedes 
us, envelops us, and supports us— Each of us is not left face-to-face with 
another human being, as the principle of morality taken in isolation seems 
to imply. Rather nature is between us, around us—not just as something to 
exploit but as an object of solicitude, respect, and admiration. The sense of 
our radical dependence on a higher power thus may be reflected in a love 
for the creature. Ricoeur’s creation-centered approach to the tension be­
tween love and justice harks back to his earlier ecological exegesis of Gen. 
1:1—2:4a. Creation precedes law, and practitioners of the law are reminded 
that the divine legislation is a gift like the creation itself. Understanding 
the gifted character of biblical obligation ensures that the performance of 
justice will not degenerate into calculative self-interest, on the one hand, 
and that the commandment to love the enemy will not slide into allowing 
oneself to become a victim of the other, on the other hand.
Two of the shorter pieces in this section, “Whoever Loses Their Life for 
My Sake Will Find It” and “The Memory of Suffering,” reprise the role 
of wisdom discourse to illuminate the nature of the human condition. The 
first essay uses a wisdom interpretation of the gospel paradox that losing 
one’s life is tantamount to finding one’s life. The paradox teaches humility 
and warns against the pride of false security, even the security of religious 
knowledge, as a foundation for discipleship. Ricoeur says the gospel para­
dox only makes sense as an invitation to give up one’s trust in God as the 
guarantor of absolute knowledge and instead trust in the weakness of the 
cross as the key to a meaningful existence.
The question of trust without security is a theme in the second essay 
as well. This paper was first delivered in Chicago to commemorate the 
Holocaust on Yom Ha-Shoah, 1989; it reads as a pastoral response to 
the wisdom theodicy adumbrated in “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and 
Theology” and the discussion of victimage in chapter 9 of Time and Nar-
59. Ricoeur, “Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule,” below, 297.
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rative, volume 3. Ricoeur suggests that retelling the stories of the victims 
of the Shoah is a moral duty that gives a voice to those who were de­
nied their voices. This retelling should avoid, however, the temptation of 
an explanatory system that would try to make theological sense out of 
the death camps. While the Bible does offer a theodicy of retribution in 
which the victims, because of their faithlessness, are held responsible for the 
violence inflicted upon them, Ricoeur argues instead for a wisdom theod­
icy of lamentation and anger where the perennial cries of Why me? and 
How long? are seen as the most adequate responses to unmitigated evil. 
“Whereas the theory of retribution makes victims and murderers equally 
guilty, the lamentation reveals the murderers as murderers and victims as 
victims. Then we may remember the victims for what they are: namely, 
the bearers of a lamentation that no explanation is able to mitigate.”^® 
The link between punishment and sin in a retribution theodicy animates 
a monstrous logic that holds victims and victimizers together as responsible 
for the Shoah. As we saw in Part Four, Ricoeur offers the alternative of a 
theodicy of complaint, nourished by biblical wisdom, as the most promising 
response to events that crush the human spirit and defy final explanation.
The essays in this volume demonstrate the value of Ricoeur’s wager on 
the power of the founding myths and discourses of Western culture to 
enable the task of existence. In particular, Ricoeur’s religious writings sug­
gest that a contrapuntal reading of Judaism’s and Christianity’s originary 
scriptural texts offers the best hope for attuning oneself to the different, 
sometimes irreconcilable, “worlds” one might inhabit in the journey to­
ward selfhood. Nuanced readings of these texts enable one to become an 
apprentice to the various forms of identity-formation within the Bible that 
can empower the move from being a nomad without hope to a storyteller 
of one’s own life. This journey to selfhood demands that one compose sev­
eral autobiographical plots and counterplots, in conversation with different 
literary genres, in order to make sense of the origin and destiny of one’s 
personal odyssey. While narrative discourse offers the reader the promise 
of a stable and seamless self emplotted by the Bible’s master stories, non­
narrative biblical discourse reminds one that the scripturally refigured self 
can never escape the aporias and discordances of daily existence. We are 
readers and writers of our own lives, subjects and authors of our own 
biographies, and our solace is in being able to weave, with freedom and 
imagination, our fragmented selves into the wider cloth of the biblical 
tapestry.
Mark I. Wallace
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